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Concerns about national, cultural and demographic preservation have become increasingly salient in the age of
migrations and globalisation. Liav Orgad fittingly points to recent political reactions to the influx of refugees in
Europe and to broader trends towards relinking citizenship and migration policies with concerns about national
identity and cultural integration. He is right to complain about the reluctance among political theorists to engage
systematically with these developments. I fully agree with Orgad that ignoring these issues is both “theoretically
wrong” and “politically unwise”. However, I disagree that majorities have special majority rights that can be
defended on the same normative basis as minority rights. I argue that if a current majority group is worried about
its rights, it should genuinely support minority rights in anticipation of its future minority status.
Orgad should be commended for his clever attempt to defend a liberal version of majority rights. He carefully
defines a palatable notion of “idea-based majorities” and aims to justify majority rights in virtue of the need to
ensure the “acceptance” of just constitutional principles that are “essential for citizenship in a given state”.
However, as Joppke points out, this narrow defence of majority rights collapses into a mere justification of
universal individual rights quarantined by liberal constitutions. This is obviously not what advocates of closed
borders and selective immigration on ethnic or religious grounds have in mind when claiming to defend their
nations. Orgad’s strong commitment to liberal constitutional principles leaves little room for culturally exclusive
immigration and citizenship policies. Attempts to promote such exclusive policies either run afoul of liberal
constitutional principles (e.g. the citizenship test proposed by Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2005) or rely on
problematic constitutional provisions that entrench ethno-national privileges (e.g. differential treatment of ethnics
and non-ethnics in many Central and Eastern European constitutions). Although liberal states can and should
seek to ensure widespread respect for constitutional principles, they cannot do so by way of ethno-cultural
engineering.
There are liberal limits to selecting immigrants and future citizens on grounds of ethnic origin, cultural
background or inner dispositions. Even if one could argue for strict(er) border controls and immigration (say, for
reasons of security or economic capacity), these restrictions should not discriminate among immigrants on
ethno-cultural grounds. Selecting people on such grounds will not only arbitrarily discriminate among immigrants
but also among citizens by differentiating between citizens who share the dominant ethno-cultural characteristics
and citizens who do not. One way around this is to introduce ethnic immigration quotas that tie inflows with the
current ethno-demographic composition of the population. Apart from lacking strong normative justifications and
having ill-famed historical precedents, this solution will not necessarily guarantee the dominance of one ethnic
group over the others. The system will have to be constantly updated to account for the ethno-demographic
changes caused by differential (ethnic) birth rates and ethno-cultural re-identification. The argument that priority
should be given to immigrants who share “our” liberal values is unhelpful because we lack effective liberal
means to test liberal dispositions. Hansen is right to argue that immigration and citizenship do not make good
tools for fighting illiberal ideas and keeping out illiberal people. Instead of agonising about the future of our liberal
principles, we should redouble our efforts to promote these principles among immigrants and citizens as well.
Exclusionary membership policies and bolstering majority rights at the expense of “threatening” minorities is
unlikely to strengthen our liberal culture(s).
Orgad justifies cultural majority rights by relying on previous defences of minority rights. It must be noted that
this strategy works only if one is convinced by liberal arguments for minority rights. Assuming a relative
consensus about the value of liberal minority rights, I argue that the normative grounds and political purposes of
minority and majority rights are markedly different. Liberal minority rights are mainly compensatory. National and
autochthonous minorities are owed special rights because dominant groups have treated them wrongfully in the
past and because, in the absence of special rights, they face unfair disadvantages. Although minorities may be
concerned about their cultural and demographic preservation, their claims against the state are limited to
securing access to a fair share of public resources and recognition. Minority rights are not tied to minorities’
present or future cultural and demographic robustness. Minorities may use their fair share of resources to
promote their identity and culture within and outside their communities, but they have no guarantees that this
promotion will be successful.
Orgad defines idea-based majorities as groups “whose members share, to a high degree, certain ideas and
principles that are dominant ones in a given society”. This definition focuses on the “dominant” character of
“ideas and principles” and says little about the normative value or worth of these principles. At a first look, this
means that majorities in societies where racism is deeply entrenched also qualify as idea-based majorities.
Orgad solves this problem by imposing a series of liberal filters to the claims of idea-based majorities. However,
what is at stake is a defence of the dominance of an idea-based group rather than a defence of its justness. As
Orgad argues, majority rights can be claimed even when the justice of institutions is not threatened. Here is, I
think, where the justifications for minority and majority rights grow visibly apart. Liberal minority rights are
compensatory for historical injustices and they seek to ensure fair access to resources and recognition. They are
justice-based claims triggered by past and present asymmetries of power between minorities and majorities (or
other minorities). Majority rights are not compensatory but preservationist. They are identity-based claims that
seek to preserve a group’s dominant position in the state beyond strict considerations of justice.
If one is genuinely concerned with the fate of minorities one should advocate for a fair and inclusive system of
minority rights from which all present and future minorities stand to benefit. If one is anxious about the fate of
diminishing majorities, one should make a case for anticipatory minority rights for majorities turning into
minorities.
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